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STEPPING OUT IN AN OLD BROWN SHOE:
IN QUALIFIED PRAISE OF SUBMARKETSt
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
One of the most widely cited paragraphs in the Supreme Court's
1962 Brown Shoe decision sets forth seven "practical indicia" for defining
"submarkets."1 Since that time, lower courts frequently have relied upon
the Brown Shoe factors as authority when defining antitrust markets. Yet
commentators are often highly critical when they do so.
This essay argues that the attraction of the Brown Shoe practical indicia
to the courts and the problems commentators recognize in their applica-
tion arise from the same source. A single analytical approach-the use
of practical indicia to identify submarkets-has been employed to
address four concepts: buyer substitution, seller substitution, unilateral
competitive effects of mergers among sellers of differentiated products,
and price discrimination markets. As antitrust has come to a better
understanding of these four economic concepts, it has become clear
that they are more effectively treated in separate analyses, as is done in
the DOJ and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
2
While the concepts of buyer and seller substitution are well understood
today, the latter two ideas, unilateral competitive effects and price dis-
crimination markets, were largely inchoate in legal commentary in 1962
and have only recently begun to be recognized and considered by the
courts. Brown Shoe can help judges address these more novel ideas by
providing lower courts with legal authority for recognizing the contempo-
rary economic concepts of unilateral competitive effects and price dis-
t For those readers closer in age to my students than to me: cf Beatles, Old Brown Shoe,
<http://top40gold.com/artist/beatles/Beatles-OldBrownShoe.html> ("Now I'm stepping
out this old brown shoe, Baby I'm in love with you").
* Associate Professor, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington,
D.C. The author is indebted to Richard Brunell for thoughtful comments and to David
Turchi for research assistance.
I Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
2 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines (1992, as amended 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 113,104 [hereinafter
1992 Merger Guidelines].
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crimination markets. But with respect to unilateral competitive effects,
this approach may be only a temporary expedient, awaiting more com-
plete adaptation of antitrust doctrine to the rich economic analysis sug-
gested by the Merger Guidelines.
To understand the uses and abuses of Brown Shoe submarkets, it is
useful to begin by reviewing the key Brown Shoe paragraph:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the
reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand
between the product itself and substitutes for it. However, within this
broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves,
constitute product markets for antitrust purposes. The boundaries of
such a submarket may be determined by examining such practical
indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate
economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique
production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to
price changes, and specialized vendors. Because § 7 of the Clayton Act
prohibits any merger which may substantially lessen competition "in
any line of commerce" (emphasis supplied), it is necessary to examine
the effects of a merger in each such economically significant submarket
to determine if there is a reasonable probability that the merger will
substantially lessen competition. If such a probability is found to exist,
the merger is proscribed.
3
The first sentence is unremarkable. It recounts that the "outer bound-
aries" of a product market are to be determined using two familiar legal
tests related to buyer substitution: "reasonable interchangeability of use
or the cross-elasticity of demand."4 The Merger Guidelines' approach
to market definition-evaluating whether the collection of products and
locations would make a valuable monopoly, given the possibility of buyer
substitution'-is a refinement of these two tests.6 The next sentences in
the Brown Shoe paragraph, which recognize the concept of submarkets
3 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 (footnotes and citation omitted).
4 A footnote to the first sentence (omitted from the quotation above) suggests that the
cross-elasticity of production facilities may also be an important factor in market definition.
This too is unremarkable, though the Merger Guidelines take the possibility of seller
substitution into account in a different way than was proposed in Brown Shoe. See generally
Jonathan B. Baker, The Problem with Baker Hughes and Syufy: On the Role of Entry in Merger
Analysis, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 353 (1997).
5 The Merger Guidelines define a market as "a product or or group of products and
a geographic area in which it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing
firm, not subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future producer or
seller of those products in that area likely would impose at least a 'small but significant
and nontransitory' increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other products are
held constant." 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1.
6 On the history of market definition, see generally GregoryJ. Werden, The History of
Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REv. 123 (1992).
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and set forth seven factors for identifying them, are the main source
of controversy.
I. SUBSTITUTION IN DEMAND AND SUPPLY
Some of the seven practical indicia appear related to the identification
of buyer substitution patterns, the concern of market definition under
the Merger Guidelines. Sensitivity to price changes, for example, could
be interpreted as suggesting a method of estimating demand cross-
elasticities. Industry recognition of the submarket as a separate economic
entity could suggest inferring buyer behavior from indirect evidence:
the views of and actions taken by sellers, who have an economic interest
in understanding buyer substitution patterns. The product's peculiar
characteristics and uses, distinct customers, distinct prices, and special-
ized vendors, might suggest gaps in the chain of substitutes, and thus
also permit inferences about likely buyer substitution patterns. These
types of evidence vary in their probative value,7 and are not necessarily
the only evidence that can be brought to bear,8 but they could all reason-
ably be read to suggest an inquiry into buyer substitution.
Another factor in the list of practical indicia, unique production facili-
ties, appears related to the identification of seller substitution patterns.
Two other factors, industry recognition of the submarket as a separate
economic entity and peculiar product characteristics, might also be
related to the flexibility of seller production. This economic force, a
type of entry, must be recognized in antitrust analysis because it could
discipline the exercise of market power. Some courts have accounted
for seller substitution possibilities through market definition, but the
Merger Guidelines do so through the identification of market partici-
pants (if seller substitution would occur quickly and with little sunk
expenditures) or through the analysis of entry. 9
7 For example, using distinct prices to define markets could lead a court improperly
to exclude the possibility that a high-price, high-quality product was a close substitute for
a low-price, low-quality product. On the other hand, when quality is related to price, price
classes may provide useful shorthand for describing collections of products properly
defining a market. E.g., United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1993)
(defining "premium" writing instrument market for pens sold in the $50 to $400 range).
s Most notably, the list omits a common approach of the federal enforcement agencies
to implementing the market definition concept of the Merger Guidelines-learning about
buyer substitution patterns by interviewing customers about their likely response to a price
increase by a hypothetical seller monopolist-unless the reference to public recognition
of the submarket as a separate economic entity is interpreted as suggesting this approach.
' See generally Baker, supra note 4. In the Merger Guidelines, entrants capable of pro-
viding new competition quickly and with little sunk expenditures (termed "uncommitted"
entrants) are assigned market shares based on their divertible capacity. All other entry
possibilities ("committed" entrants) are assessed for timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency.
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Used in this way, the Brown Shoe practical indicia can be interpreted
as "evidentiary proxies for direct proof of substitutability" in demand
and supply (or "as proxies for cross-elasticities"), which is how they were
treated in Rothery, a D.C. Circuit opinion written byjudge Robert Bork.'0
Had the Brown Shoe factors exclusively been applied as proxies for substi-
tutability, they would not have drawn sharp criticism from commentators.
The main concern of the critics is that the practical indicia sometimes
have been applied blindly, without reference to the goals of identifying
buyer and seller substitution possibilities." Blind application allowed
courts to define inappropriately narrow submarkets within the outer
bounds of markets properly defined with reference to substitution possi-
bilities.12 In consequence, courts improperly identified market power in
situations where the firms were in fact competing vigorously. 13 According
to Professors Gellhorn and Kovacic, "[T] he submarket concept too often
served as an irresistible tool for courts and enforcement agencies to
gerrymander markets to achieve preferred outcomes."" The commen-
tary critical of the Brown Shoe approach to market definition resolved
itself into a slogan: there are no submarkets, only markets. 5 This slogan
sought to discourage courts from delineating unduly narrow entities as
relevant antitrust markets by relating the Brown Shoe practical indicia to
10 Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 & n.4, 219
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.).
I' See Lawrence C. Maisel, Submarkets in Merger and Monopolization Cases, 72 GEO. L. REV.
39,44 n.3 0 (1983); cf. David A. Clanton, Focusing the Inquiry: Specificity in the Merger Guidelines
and Elsewhere, 71 CAL. L. REV. 430, 439 (1983) (commending 1982 Merger Guidelines for
presenting a model of market definition that explains the relevance of each factor, in
contrast with the "laundry list" of factors set forth in Brown Shoe).
12 The concept of submarkets has been applied to market definition under the Sherman
Act as well as in merger analysis. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 3.2c, at 88 & n.12, 89 (2d ed. 1999).
11 See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 12, HORIZONTAL MERGERS:
LAW AND POLICY 128-29 (1986); 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 533
(1995); ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS
377-79, 402-03 (4th ed. 1994); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PER-
SPECTIVE 129 (1976); James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated Products: The Need
for a Workable Standard, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 699 (1995); Maisel, supra note 11; Panel
Discussion: The New Merger Guidelines, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 317, 321 (remarks of William F.
Baxter), 328-29 (remarks of Donald F. Turner) (1982). Cf Werden, supra note 6, at
160-61 (collecting commentary to demonstrate that the submarket concept "was not well
received by most commentators" in the wake of Brown Shoe).
14 GELLHORN & KoVACIC, supra note 13, at 378.
15 See, e.g., H.J., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1540 (8th Cir.
1989) (the "same proof" establishes the existence of a product market and a product
submarket); White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 500 (6th
Cir. 1983) ("a submarket is a market"). Recent commentary accepts that submarkets should
be defined using the same criteria as markets. See, e.g., 2A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 13,
533c; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 3.2c (2d ed. 1999).
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the analysis of buyer and seller substitution possibilities employed in
market definition.
To the extent this slogan suggests that when a broad aggregation of
products constitutes a market, a narrower collection cannot also do so,
it misleads. For example, it is plausible that a monopolist of all beverages
would find a price increase profitable, and thus "beverages" would consti-
tute a product market. That observation would not preclude the possibil-
ity that a monopolist of all carbonated soft drinks would find a price
rise profitable, and thus that "carbonated soft drinks" would constitute
a product market, or the possibility that "cola-flavored soft drinks" would
also simultaneously constitute a product market, all defined based on
familiar criteria involving buyer substitution. 6 Although a court might
often focus its concern and analysis on the smallest such market, as
the Merger Guidelines "generally" recommend, 17 a court is entitled to
identify a violation of the antitrust laws based on harmful effects in any
market, even one that is not the smallest. 8 Doing so does not undermine
the economic point of market definition if all such markets, whether
broad or narrow, are defined with reference to substitution possibilities,
as through the Merger Guidelines methodology.
There should be little controversy about the Brown Shoe practical indicia
to the extent they are used as proxies for demand and supply substitutabil-
ity. Courts have also used the practical indicia, and the submarkets they
define, as basis for recognizing two other important economic concepts
also found in the Merger Guidelines: price discrimination markets and
the unilateral competitive effects of mergers among sellers of differenti-
ated products. Application of the submarket concept to price discrimina-
tion markets should also not be controversial, as will be discussed in the
next section. But much debate has arisen from the use of submarkets
in the analysis of unilateral competitive effects of mergers. This topic
will be addressed below in Part III.
II. PRICE DISCRIMINATION
The term price discrimination market is applied when a hypothetical
monopolist of a group of products and location would raise price profit-
ably to a class of targeted buyers, notwithstanding the incentive of buyers
16 Accord HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 3.2c ("the existence of a relatively large relevant
market does not preclude the existence of smaller markets within it.").
17 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § I.1.
'8E.g., Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1993) (existence of a narrow
relevant product market does not preclude a finding of violation in a broader market
that encompasses the narrow market).
2000]
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to substitute to other products and more distant sellers or to attempt to
purchase the product in resale from more favored buyers.19 Commenta-
tors and courts have recognized that at least some of the Brown Shoe
factors-particularly distinct customers-can be used to identify this
situation.
20
Ansell Inc. v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc. 21 provides a representative exam-
ple. 22 Ansell, the plaintiff, proposed to define a market consisting of
the sale of latex condoms through retail outlets in the United States.
Defendant Schmid sought to broaden the market to encompass all whole-
sale condom sales in the United States. The broader product market
would include condom sales to the U. S. Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID) through a substantial annual bulk procurement auc-
tion. 23 Condoms were typically sold to USAID for only one-quarter of
the price the manufacturers received from retail distributors. USAID
distributed the condoms it purchased free of charge in third-world coun-
tries; there was apparently little possibility that these low-cost condoms
would be resold to domestic retailers.
On these facts, market definition would be straightforward under the
approach of the Merger Guidelines. A hypothetical condom monopolist
would likely be able to charge a high price to retailers even if it charged
19 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1.12 (product market definition in the pres-
ence of price discrimination), § 1.22 (geographic market definition in the presence of
price discrimination).
20 The commentary includes, e.g., 2A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 13, § 533d ("A common
situation inviting submarket talk is price discrimination."); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION
MONOGRAPH, supra note 13, at 130; Keyte, supra note 13, at 739-45; cf. Maisel, supra note
11, at 55, 63, 66 (recognizing that "distinct customers" may help define price discrimination
markets while encouraging courts to resist the temptation to label those markets sub-
markets).
21 757 F. Supp. 467 (D. N.J.) (rejecting antitrust challenge to an acquisition by the target
for failure to show antitrust injury), affd, 941 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1991).
22 For other examples, see, e.g., Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86, 90
(E.D.N.Y.) (defining, based on Brown Shoe factors, a submarket of carrier-based aircraft
sold to the U.S. Navy), affd, 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Wis.) (large mining excavator loader submarket defined,
distinct from hydraulic mining excavators, in part because the former have distinct custom-
ers in surface miners and very heavy earth-moving contractors), affd, 624 F.2d 1103 (7th
Cir. 1979); Avnet, Inc. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 70, 78-79 (7th Cir. 1975) (upholding submarket
defined as sale of new components for automotive electrical units to production-line
rebuilders, excluding sales to repair shops based on functional differences between the
customer classes); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46-49 (D.D.C. 1998)
(drug distribution through wholesalers submarket defined within a broader product mar-
ket encompassing the delivery of prescription drugs by all forms of distribution, where
certain customer classes (hospitals, independent pharmacies, and non-warehousing retail
drug chains) lack good distribution alternatives).
23 The procurement auction was conducted by the General Services Administration for
USAID; for simplicity, USAID is termed the buyer.
[Vol. 68
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a low price to USAID, 24 If retailers (or their customers) were targeted
buyers against whom a hypothetical condom monopolist would discrimi-
nate in price, condoms sold at retail would properly constitute an anti-
trust product market.
The court relied upon the Brown Shoe factors to reach a similar conclu-
sion, finding that the narrow market proposed by Ansell constituted a
submarket within the broader market alleged by Schmid. For example,
the court found that condoms sold at retail were recognized by the
industry as a separate economic entity, and that retail distributors are a
customer group distinct from USAID.25 Moreover, condoms were sold
to the two groups at distinct prices, and the price of latex condoms sold
to USAID was not sensitive to changes in the price of condoms sold to
the retail trade.
III. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
Many of the most controversial uses of the submarket concept involve
its application to analyze mergers or acquisitions in industries in which
products are differentiated. Product differentiation is pervasive in the
economy. Goods or services may differ along a wide range of physical
and non-physical characteristics, such as features, colors, and style, geo-
graphic location, point-of-sale or post-sale services (for example, demon-
strations or warranties), seller reputations for quality, delivery time,
defect rate, and non-physical attributes of brands (for example, related
to lifestyle). Examples of product differentiation might include branded
consumer product industries, such as soft drinks and breakfast cereals;
markets in which buyers see important differences in the nature or
quality of services offered by potential suppliers, such as automotive steel
or auditing services provided by accounting firms; or industries, such
as supermarkets or hospitals, where differences in seller locations are
important to buyers.
A merger among sellers in differentiated product industries may harm
competition if it results in the loss of "localized" competition among
products sold by the parties.26 Put differently, the transaction may be
24 If USAID is more price sensitive than retail condom buyers, a condom monopolist
would likely find it profitable to price discriminate in this way.
25 757 F. Supp. at 472-73.
26 Competition may be localized if sellers have different geographic locations, and buyers
find it costly to shift from nearby to more distant sellers. Such buyers will typically choose
among nearby sellers, and not patronize distant sellers unless the latter undercut the price
of nearby sellers by more than the transportation costs of making transactions at a distance.
Competition is also termed localized if sellers have different locations in a metaphorical
"product space," and buyers have preferences among seller or product characteristics.
Such buyers will typically choose among sellers with similar product offerings, and not
2000]
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harmful if it removes an important source of competitive discipline for
any or all of the two firms' products. 27 Although this theory of harmful
competitive effects of mergers may not have been well understood in
1962,28 the extent of localized competition among the merger partners
depends on the same economic force long recognized to be at issue
in market definition: buyer substitution. Accordingly, it is possible, in
principle, to use the tool of market definition-and the Brown Shoe
practical indicia, to the extent they are proxies for buyer substitution-
to identify mergers that would lead to higher prices through the loss of
localized competition.
The decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc. 29 provides a
recent example of a district court that appears to have found its way to
prohibiting a merger that would lead to the loss of significant localized
competition by following the analytic route of defining a narrow market
based on applying the Brown Shoe practical indica of submarkets. 30 This
substitute sellers offering products with very different characteristics unless the latter
offer their products at a substantial discount. In both situations, neighboring sellers (in
geographic or product space) more closely compete with each other than with more
distant sellers.
27 If a firm selling product A acquires product B from a rival, the merged firm's unilateral
post-merger incentive to raise the price of product A will be greater the larger the number
of buyers of product A who would react to a price increase by shifting to product B. See
generally 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, at § 2.21; Jonathan B. Baker, Product
Differentiation Through Space and Time: Some Antitrust Policy Issues, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 177
(1997); Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, ANTI-
TRUST, Spring 1997, at 21; Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST,
Spring 1996, at 23.
28 This theory did not become important in antitrust practice until after economists
developed ways to quantify the magnitude of the anticompetitive effects; the use of econo-
metric techniques to do so began with my work with Timothy Bresnahan on the use of
residual demand estimation in merger analysis.Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan,
The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product-Differentiated Industries, 33 J. INDUS. EcoN. 427
(1985). The theory did not appear in the Merger Guidelines until 1992 (where it is
termed the lessening of competition through unilateral competitive effects among firms
distinguished primarily by differentiated products).
29 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
10 It is not always clear whether judges who define a narrow submarket within a broader
market do so in order to recognize localized competition among sellers of differentiated
products, for two reasons: courts that rely on a strong presumption of harm to competition
from mergers leading to high and increasing concentration do not need to explain their
theory of how the transaction will harm competition; and identifying localized competition
is closely related to market definition. Still, there are a number of plausible candidates
aside from Staples. See, e.g., U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986 (lth
Cir. 1993) (excluding Danforth brand anchors from a lightweight generic and economy
fluke anchors product market, notwithstanding functional interchangeability, based on
Brown Shoe practical indicia); Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993) (employing
the Brown Shoe factors to define a product market of dry sanitizer swimming pool chemicals
within a broader "all pool sanitizers" market that also included liquid bleach); Bon-Ton
Stores, Inc., v. May Dept. Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (department stores
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example illustrates the advantages and drawbacks of this controversial
use of the submarket concept.
The Staples case arose out of an FTC challenge to Staples' proposed
acquisition of Office Depot. Both of these firms sell office supplies in a
superstore format. At the time of the transaction, they each operated
over 500 stores covering much of the country, as did a third superstore
chain, OfficeMax. Office supplies also were sold by a variety of other
types of retailers, including independent retail office supply stores, mass
merchandisers like Wal-Mart and Kmart, wholseale clubs like B.J.'s and
Price Costco, computer or electronic stores like Best Buy and CompUSA,
mail order firms like Quill and Viking, and contract stationers.
Product market definition was perhaps the most hotly contested issue
in the case; indeed, the trial judge observed that the outcome "hinges"
on the proper market definition. 3' The court began its analysis of this
question by defining a broad market encompassing the sale of consum-
able office supplies by all sellers, recognizing "that those sellers must, at
some level, compete with one another."32 But the court went on to define
a submarket consisting of the sale of consumable office supplies by office
superstores, relying on an application of the Brown Shoe practical indica
as legal authority for doing so.
The trial judge recognized that his market definition had to "over-
come" a "first blush" or "initial gut reaction" that the product market
must include all retailers of office supplies.3 After all, "[t]he products
... are undeniably the same no matter who sells them, and no one
denies that many different types of retailers sell those products. '34 The
judge also noted two other reasons for questioning his decision to limit
the market to the sale of office supplies by superstores: the fact that
"Staples and Office Depot do not ignore [non-superstore] sellers such
as warehouse clubs, Best Buy, or Wal-Mart, ' s5 and skepticism by some
product submarket); Remington Prods., Inc. v. North American Philips Corp., 717 F. Supp.
36 (D. Conn. 1989) (electric shaver submarket); Tasty Baking Co., Inc. v. Ralston Purina,
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (defining a snack cakes and pies submarket,
though not recognizing a market for premium snack cakes and pies); Weeks Dredging &
Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (bucket
dredging submarket within all dredging market); United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co.,
440 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (frozen dessert pies market); United States v. Black and
Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976) (product submarket of lightweight,
inexpensive gasoline powered saws sold to occasional users).
3' Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1073.
32 Id. at 1075.
3 Id.
4 Id.
s1 Id. at 1079.
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other courts about the existence of "submarkets similar to the one found
... in this case."36 Moreover, the court's factual conclusion that "office
superstores are ... very different in apperance, physical size, format, the
number and variety of SKU's offered, and the type of customers targeted
and served than other sellers of office supplies" appears to be based
more on a qualitative judgment than hard evidence
7
What initially appeared to be a difficult market definition problem
was made easy for the trial court by the "compelling" pricing evidence,38
which the court found to correspond with Brown Shoe's "sensitivity to
price changes" factor. 39 That evidence showed that Staples charged sig-
nificantly higher prices-at least 5 percent and as much as 13 percent
higher-in geographic markets where it had no office superstore compe-
tition than in markets where it competed with the two other superstore
chains, 40 notwithstanding the presence of a wide range of non-superstore
retailers of office supplies in the single superstore markets. 41 The pricing
evidence was reinforced by the "abundant" evidence on another Brown
Shoe factor, industry recognition of the submarket as a separate eco-
nomic entity; in internal documents of the merging firms, the parties
"refer to, discuss, and make business decisions based upon the assump-
tion that 'competition' refers to other office superstores only.14 2 Of these
two factors, the pricing evidence was the more important. The court
noted that the proof offered by the FrC focused "primarily" on it,4"
36 Id. at 1081. The judge saw the prior decisions as mixed, and observed that he was not
the first to find a narrower submarket within a larger market. Id. at 1080.
17 Id. at 1078. The court observed that "[i]t is difficult to fully articulate and explain all
of the ways in which superstores are unique."Id at 1079. When defending this conclusion
in quantitative terms, the trial judge employed highly qualified sentences, such as: "While
the Court accepts that some small businesses with fewer than 20 employees as well as
home office customers do choose other sellers of office supplies, the superstores' customers
are different from those of many of the purported competitors." Id. at 1078 (emphasis
added). In contrast, after visiting the various stores in person, the judge felt confident
making the qualitative judgment: "You certainly know an office superstore when you see
one." Id. at 1079.
3 Id. at 1076.
39 Id. at 1075.
40 Id. at 1076. The court relied both on evidence of pricing differentials across markets
(finding that Staples charged higher prices in cities where Staples did not face superstore
markets) and evidence of pricing differentials across time that varied with the extent of
superstore competition (finding that Staples changed price zones to lower prices when
faced with entry of another superstore, but not for other retailers). Id. at 1077-78. Similarly,
the FTC's econometric evidence, also based on both cross-section and time series analyses,
showed that the merger would likely lead to an 8% increase in Staples' prices. Jonathan
B. Baker, Econometric Analysis in FTC v. Staples, 18J. PuB. POL'Y & MKTG. 11 (1999).
"' Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1077.
42 Id. at 1079.
11 Id. at 1075.
[Vol. 68
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while also observing that the documentary evidence on the other factor,
industry recognition, did not point exclusively in one direction.
44
Within the product submarket of consumable office supplies sold
through superstores, the proposed merger was a merger to monopoly
in many geographic markets (metropolitan areas), and it increased con-
centration substantially in many other markets where OfficeMax would
remain as a superstore competitor.4 5 This was not the only indication
that a merger between Staples and Office Depot would lessen competi-
tion. The court explained that the evidence on pricing, which it discussed
with respect to defining the relevant product market, also indicated that
the transaction would harm competition-because "an office superstore
chain facing no competition from other superstores has the ability to
profitably raise prices for consumable office supplies above competi-
tive levels."
4 6
When the court discussed the likely competitive effects of the merger,
it explained that the transaction would lead to higher prices through
the loss of localized competition among the merging superstore chains:
[D]irect evidence shows that by eliminating Staples' most significant,
and in many markets only, rival, this merger would allow Staples to
increase prices or otherwise maintain prices at an anticompetitive level.
The merger would eliminate significant head-to-head competition
between the two lowest cost and lowest priced firms in the superstore
market.
47
This passage articulates a competitive effects theory consistent with the
unilateral effects theory for mergers among differentiated products set
forth in the Merger Guidelines, though the court, having defined a
narrow market, did not frame its theory that way. The court's theory
does not rely upon coordination among firms beyond the merger part-
ners. Had the court instead defined only a broader market, it should
still have found harm to competition from the loss of "head-to-head
competition" between a firm and a "significant" rival among sellers of
differentiated products, that would demonstrably (with "direct evi-
dence") allow the firm to "increase prices." Neither the scope of the
relevant product market nor market shares (which provide indirect evi-
" Id. at 1079 (finding that "Staples and Office Depot do not ignore [non-superstore]
sellers such as warehouse clubs, Best Buy, or Wal-Mart").
41 Id. at 1081. In addition, the court noted that allowing the defendants to merge would
eliminate future competition in cities where the two firms, which were expanding rapidly,
would likely have entered in competition with each other. Id. at 1082.
4 Id. at 1082.
47 Id. at 1083 (footnote omitted).
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dence about a matter on which powerful direct evidence was available)
should alter this reasoning.
The Staples case highlights the benefit of defining Brown Shoe sub-
markets for addressing the loss of localized competition resulting from
mergers among sellers of differentiated products. Had the court not
defined a submarket of office supply sales through superstores, but
instead analyzed the transaction exclusively in a broader market of all
retail sales of consumable office supplies, the merger would have led to
a tiny increase in market concentration; the court observes that the
combined firm would have only a 5.5 percent share of that overall
market.48 Under such circumstances, the direct evidence that the merger
would lead to higher prices by reducing localized competition would
have appeared in conflict with indirect evidence, derived from market
concentration, suggesting that the transaction was unlikely to harm com-
petition. The direct evidence that the merger would harm competition
would have been just as powerful, and the indirect evidence that it would
not harm competition would have been weak, given that market shares
are poor predictors of the extent of localized competition among sellers
of differentiated products,4 9 but the court nevertheless would have been
required to make the case for preferring the direct pricing evidence in the
face of very low market shares. In contrast, after defining the submarket,
market concentration evidence and direct evidence pointed to the same
conclusion; the court had no need to explain away low market shares.
Staples also suggests the problems with relying on Brown Shoe sub-
markets to address the loss of localized competition from merger. Most
important, market definition becomes an expositional tool rather than
an analytic tool when, as in Staples, it is "reverse engineered." The
Staples court first credited the evidence that direct competition between
Staples and Office Depot lowers price where the two were head-to-
head (particularly in the absence of OfficeMax), then used that pricing
evidence as the main basis for defining a superstore market. Leading
with the pricing evidence was a good litigation strategy on the part of
the FTC trial team and a useful rhetorical device for the judge to explain
his decision, because it permitted both the Commission staff and the
court to sidestep a seeming disjunction between direct evidence of likely
anticompetitive effects from defendants' pricing and indirect evidence
derived from market concentration. But when this approach is employed,
market definition is not being used as intended, namely to help the
court determine whether the transaction will likely harm competition.
48 Id. at 1075.
49 E.g., Baker, Product Differentiation, supra note 27, at 183.
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In other words, if the answer to the ultimate question (whether price
will rise) is the basis for market definition, market definition and market
concentration are conclusory, not an autonomous method of analysis.
In other cases, moreover, the submarket reflective of localized compe-
tition may not be as simple to describe or as easy to identify as the
superstore submarket in Staples. Had a court been asked to analyze a
hypothetical merger between Anheuser-Busch (Budweiser) and Pabst
during the late 1970s, for example, it might have been faced with direct
evidence (as from econometric analyses 50 ) that the transaction would
have led to an increase in the price of Budweiser.5 To recognize that
localized competition through submarket analysis, a court might have
needed to define a product submarket limited to Budweiser and Pabst;
otherwise the market would surely include Miller, and concentration
might not have risen sufficiently to suggest a competitive problem. 52 But
it might not have been possible to reach a Budweiser-Pabst product
market in the hypothetical example through the standards of the Merger
Guidelines for two reasons. First, if the Budweiser price increase would
not quite reach the "small but significant" price increase benchmark in
the Guidelines (often 5 percent), the market would need to be broad-
ened.53 Second, if, in the event of a Budweiser price increase, more
Budweiser drinkers switch to Miller than to Pabst, the market definition
exercise beginning with Budweiser would add Miller before it added
Pabst-notwithstanding the presence of significant localized competi-
tion between Budweiser and Pabst.54 Even absent these problems, more-
over, a court would be wary of defining a product market limited to
Budweiser and Pabst. A decision to exclude Miller could readily appear to
50 With econometric methods, it may be possible to make fine distinctions about the
competitive role played by individual products in branded consumer products industries.
Econometric methods employed in antitrust are surveyed in Jonathan B. Baker & Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique, 1 Am. L. & EcoN.
REv. 386 (1999). See also Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Market Definition with Differentiated Products:
The Post-Nabisco Cereal Merger, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 163 (2000);Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy
F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 3 (1992).
1 See Baker & Bresnahan, supra note 28.
12 In the actual brewing industry of the late 1970s, the market shares of Budweiser and
Pabst would probably have been high enough to keep the merger out of the Guidelines'
safe harbors in many plausible geographic markets. But localized competition between
Pabst and Budweiser could have been just as important in other plausible geographic
markets where the firms were much smaller.
11 The smaller price rise would remain anticompetitive; the 5% test is simply a methodo-
logcial tool, not a tolerance level for a price increase. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note
2, § 1.0.




reflect result-oriented gerrymandering by the judge rather than careful
analysis.55 This risk is particularly strong in differentiated-product indus-
tries characterized by a proliferation of products differing in small ways
across multiple dimensions.
6
Furthermore, a Budweiser-Pabst submarket is probably not the same
product market the court would define were it interested in assessing
the likelihood that the merger would increase the probability or effective-
ness of industry coordination.5 7 While coordination between these two
firms could have led to a small anticompetitive price increase, coordina-
tion among all brewers would plausibly result in a much larger price
rise for these and many other brands.5 A market definition suitable for
analyzing the loss of localized competition may well be unduly narrow
for analyzing the likelihood of post-merger coordination, even though
the same economic force, buyer substitution, is at stake in each. There
is no theoretical bar to using the market definition machinery-and the
Brown Shoe practical indicia-to identify submarkets in which localized
competition is important, even if a broader market is also defined for
analyzing the likelihood of coordinated competitive effects. 59 But in an
era in which every contested market delineation favoring plaintiffs risks
criticism as result-driven gerrymandering-when the music of market
definition is captured by the slogan "there are no submarkets, only
markets"-reliance upon market definition as the methodology for isolat-
55 The Staples court was protected against this charge by the presence of evidence consis-
tent with another Brown Shoe factor, industry recognition of the submarket. But this factor
will not be present in every case where competition is localized.
. Cf James A. Keyte, Premium Fountain Pens and Gift Boxed Chocolates: Market Definition
and Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST, Fall 1993, at 19, 22 ("the more choices available to
consumers in industries with differentiated products, the more likely the market will be
defined broadly or anticompetitive effects will not be found").
57 To reach the broader market under the Merger Guidelines, the court might choose
to apply a "small but significant" price increase benchmark greater than 5% when analyzing
the prospects for coordination, even if it used a 5% or lower price increase benchmark
for analyzing the potential loss of localized competition. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra
note 2, § 1.11 (although a 5% figure will be employed "in most contexts," the appropriate
benchmark "will depend on the nature of the industry" and the agency may "at times"
use a higher or lower figure); cf. Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust,
Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187 (2000) ("Market power and
market definition ... should not be analyzed in a vacuum. . . divorced from the conduct
and allegations about its effects.").
18 Even if Pabst had a small share in a broad market, its acquisition could facilitate
coordination, for example, if it were a "maverick" whose presence made it difficult for
the two major firms, Anheuser-Busch and Miller, to reach or enforce a tacit cartel arrange-
ment with other brewers that would allow the industry participants to capture much of
the monopoly profits potentially available in the beer market. See 1992 Merger Guidelines,
supra note 2, § 2.11 (potential harm from the acquisition of a maverick firm that limits
coordination among its rivals).
5' See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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ing localized competition risks jeopardizing the role of market definition
in the coordination inquiry, where market definition and market shares
are generally more useful to the analysis. In short, the submarket strategy
for identifying the loss of localized competition has strong potential for
confusion with the traditional strategy for identifying mergers that are
likely to make coordination more likely or more effective.
At their root, these problems with the strategy of identifying unilateral
competitive effects of mergers in differentiated products industries
through narrow market definitions arise because market definition is
generally not very helpful as a first step in assessing the potential loss
of localized competition. 6° Market shares-the immediate implications
of market definition-often reveal little about the competitive role
played by individual firms in differentiated product industries or the
nature of localized competition among market participants. 6 Accord-
ingly, when the goal is to identify the loss of localized competition,
market definition can be expected to have a conclusory aspect to it: It
would not be employed as a method analyzing anticompetitive possibili-
ties but instead used as a way to articulate a competitive effect identified
through other means, as through the pricing evidence proffered in
Staples. 62
IV. CONCLUSION
Submarkets identified through the Brown Shoe practical indicia have
been employed by courts to address buyer substitution, seller substitution,
60 Cf James F. Rill, Practicing What They Preach: One Lawyer's View of Econometric Models in
Differentiated Products Mergers, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 393, 401 (1997) (enforcement agency
economists "appear to be employing an approach which undertakes to identify effects
first," before defining a relevant market, when assessing the possible loss of localized
competition among sellers of differentiated products). In contrast, when the goal is to
identify mergers that make coordination more likely or more effective, it is generally
useful, as well as traditional, to commence the analysis by identifying a set of products
and locations that would constitute a valuable monopoly (market definition) and determin-
ing the identity of the firms participating in that market and their market shares. The
likelihood that those firms would successfully reduce output and raise price collectively
after the market's structure has changed through acquisition can then be assessed by
examining market shares, in conjunction with other information.
61 See Baker, Product Differentiation, supra note 27, at 183. The competitive role played by
an individual firm in a differentiated product industry can be complex. Any individual
product or location will typically have both closer and more distant substitutes from the
perspective of buyers, and substitution patterns need not be symmetric.Jonathan B. Baker,
Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 347, 357 & n.39 (1997).
62 If the likely harm to competition from a merger can be demonstrated directly, there
must exist a market where harm will occur, but there is little need for a court to specify
the market's precise boundaries. See Baker, Product Differentiation, supra note 27, at 185-87
(proposing "res ipsa loquitur" market definition). Market definition would still be required
if safe harbors based on concentration are to be applied, however.
20001
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
price discrimination markets, and localized competition at risk of loss
from merger. Market definition is well suited for recognizing buyer
substitution, and is used that way in the modern Merger Guidelines.
But, as the Guidelines also recognize, seller substitution is best handled
through other analyses-assigning market shares to entrants capable of
providing new competition quickly and with little sunk expenditures,
and analyzing whether other entry would be timely, likely, and sufficient.
Price discrimination markets can also be identified using some Brown
Shoe factors; the Merger Guidelines clarify how and why.
Much of the controversy involving submarket definition arises from
its use to define narrow markets to capture localized competiton in
differentiated-product industries. Because the identification of localized
competition turns on the same economic force at issue in market def-
inition, i.e., buyer substitution, courts have been drawn to the well-
established doctrines of market and submarket definition for doing
so. This is a healthy development as a doctrinal way station toward
incorporating unilateral competitive effects doctrine directly into the
case law, as exemplified in the Staples case. But it is ultimately not the
best way to approach unilateral competitive effects because market defi-
nition is generally not very helpful as a first step in assessing the potential
loss of localized competition. I have argued elsewhere that antitrust
doctrine can be expected to adapt to this situation by giving a greater
role to direct evidence of harm to competition in evaluating mergers
among sellers of differentiated products, and a lesser role to market
definition and market shares in such settings."' To the extent this occurs,
the controversy over Brown Shoe submarkets likely will abate.
63 See Baker, Product Differentiation, supra note 27, at 185-87; Baker, Contemporary Empirical
Merger Analysis, supra note 61, at 351.
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